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in the instant case. Its reluctance to settle this phase of the law will call
for a complete reversal by the legal writers who presumed the premature
demise of Pennoyer v. Neff.- ' Although Ilanson did not set out the limits





The owner of a rental automobile informed tile renter that tile car
was not to be driven by anyone other than himself and included a
clause to that effect in the contract. The bailec allowed a third party
to use the car who negligently collided with the plaintiff's automobile.
Held, the contract provision does not relieve the company of responsibility
for negligent operation of the automobile by a person other than the
renter. Leonard v. Susco Car Rental Sys., 103 So.2d 243 (V1a. App. 1958).
The common-law generally restricts liability of an automobile owner
for the negligent operation of his vehicle by another to the master-servant
relationship; in the absence of such a relationship the owner who
entrusts his car to a competent operator is not responsible for the operator's
negligence while he is using the car for his own purposes.' Several states
have enacted statutes which modify this common-law rule restricting
liability to the doctrine of respondeat superior.2 but only one jurisdiction,
Florida, has judicially expanded the common-law by the application of
the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to automobiles. '
The Supreme Court of Florida first applied the doctrine to an auto-
mobile in 1917,1 and the principle has since received legislative recognition.5
The doctrine was originally limited to master-servant and principal-agent
1. Downs v. Norrell, 261 Ala, 430, 74 Sn.2d 593 (1954); Field v. Evans, 262
Mass. 315, 159 N.E. 751 (1928); Maiswinkle v. Peln Jersey Auto Supply Co., 121
N.J.L. 349. 2 A,2d 593 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Cencebaugh v. Ridley, 101 Ohio App. 233,
139 N.E.2d 57 (1953); Kantola v. Lovell Auto Co., 157 Ore. 534, 72 P.2d 61 (1937); 5a
AM. JUR. Automobiles §576 (1956); 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles 1428 (1949); Annot.,
100 A.L.R. 920 (1936).
2. E.g., CAL. VIIIcI.: Cooc ANN. § 402 (Supp. 1957); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-424
Supp. V1, 1951); IAO Corn, ANN. § 49-1404 (1957); IOWA CODE ANN. C. 321.
321.493 (Supp. 1958); Mric. CoME. LAws § 257.401 (Supp. 1956); NINN. STAT.
ANN. § 170.54 (West 1945); N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 59; R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 31-31-3 (1956).
3. Weber v. Porco, 100 So.2d 146 (Fin. 1958); l.ylh v, \Vrlker. 159 Fin. 188.
31 So.2d 268 (1947); 3 171.A. JuR. Automobiles §§ 90, 152 (195); 2 Fi ORIA LAW AND
PRACTICE Automobiles §§ 10. 36 (1955); 5 B.AslrIELD, CYCLOPE.DIA OF Au'rOmOBILE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 2911 (Perm. ed, 1953); Comment, 5 U. FLA. L. REv. 412 (1952).
4. Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975 (1917).
5. FLA. STAT. § 51.12 (1957),
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relationships, thus, bailments were not covered 7 It is now settled that
a bailor is liable for the negligent operation of his automobile by a bailee.
In the leading Florida case involving a bailment, Lynch v. \Valker, the
development 0 of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine as a ground for
vicarious liability is discussed, and the principle is stated as follows: "When
an owner authorizes and permits his automobile to be used by another
he is liable in damages for injuries to third persons caused by the negligent
operation so authorized by the owner. ' " (Emphasis added.)
The Florida courts treat consent to operate the automobile, either
expressed or implied, as a prerequisite to extension of liability to the
owner. 12 It is not necessary that consent be granted for the particular
mission,' 3 type of use, 14 or period of time'- involved; consent to the use
of the vehicle is sufficient to hold the owner liable for the negligence of
the driver.' Consent has been found in situations where the automobile
was operated in direct violation of the owner's expressed orders.'7  Prior
to the instant case, the most liberal interpretation of the consent element
occurred in Fleming v. Alter.'8 In that case a pedestrian, injured due
to the negligent operation of a rental car by the bailee's ostensible wife,
was allowed to recover from the U-Drive-It company. The court held
that the company in renting the car implicdly consented to its use by
members of the bailec's family.'
9
In the instant case the court refused to accept the dictum contained
in the Fleming decision which indicated that a clause restricting use of
6. Warner v. Coding, 91 Fla. 260, 107 So. 406 (1926); Eppinger & Russell Co.
v. Trembly, 90 Fla. 145, 106 So. 879 (1925).
7. White v. Holmes, 89 Fla. 251, 103 So. 623 (1925).
8. Fleming v. Alter, 69 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1953); Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188,
31 So.2d 268 (1947); Engleman v. Trager, 102 Fla. 756, 136 So. 527 (1931); Herr v.
Butler, 101 F1a. 1125, 132 So. 815 (1931).
9. 159 FIa. 188, 31 So.2d 268 (1947).
10. For recent discussions of the theory of law that supports the doctrines see \Weber
v. Porco, 100 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1958), and May v. Pain Beach Chem. Co., 77 So.2d 468
(Fla. 1955).
11. Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 194, 31 So.2d 268, 271 (1947).
12. Lynch v. Walker, suipra note 11; City Grocery Co. v. Cothron, 117 Fla. 322,
157 So. 891 (1934); Englenan v. Trager, 102 Fla. 756, 136 So. 527 (1931).
13. Jacksonville Paper Go, v. Carlile, 153 Fla. 661, 15 So.2d 443 (1943); Atlantic
Food Supply Co. v. Massey, 152 Fla. 43, 10 So,2d 718 (1942); Southern Cotton Oil Co,
v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
14. Cropper v. United States. 81 F. Supp. 81 (N.D. Fla. 1948); Chase & Co. v.
Benefield, 64 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1953).
15. Englernan v. Trager, 102 FIa. 756, 136 So. 527 (1931).
16. "Under the law of this state, if the owner once gives his express or implied
consent to another to operate his atttomnobile, lie is liable for the negligent operation of
it no matter where the driver goes, stops, or starts." Boggs v. Butler, 129 Fla. 324, 327,
176 So. 174, 176 (1937).
17. Cropper v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 81 (N.D. Fla. 1948); Jacksonville Paper
Co. v. Carlile, 153 Fla. 661, 15 So.2d 443 (1943).
18. 69 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1953).
19. For discussion of the case see Note, 7 U. FLA. L. REv. 356 (1954).
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the car would effectively bar liability of the owner for negligence of one
other than the bailee 0" The court found implied consent for the bailee
to use the car for all ordinary purposes for which an automobile is rented,
and evidently included the use of the car by others within that definition.2 1
The majority considered the private contract between the bailee and
bailor as insufficient to bar the rights of the public or to alter the owner's
implied consent to the use of the automobile by others.22 The dissenting
judge felt there was an express witholding of consent to the use of the
car by one other than the renter, and therefore the dangerous instru-
mentality doctrine should not be applied.
2 3
The court in the present decision seems to have acted directly contrary
to the views of the Supreme Court of Florida as expressed in Fleming v.
Alter.24 After an analysis of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine with
emphasis on the requisite consent for liability under the doctrine, the
majority abruptly concludes its opinion by finding an implied consent to
the use of the car by others, without precedent to support such a conclusion.
In effect, vicarious liability has been imposed upon rental owners based
upon implied consent to the operation of their vehicles by persons other
than the bailee, when in actuality such consent is not granted and is in
fact expressly withheld. It is submitted that Judge Carroll's conclusion
in the dissent appropriately asserts the objection to the majority's holding;
if public policy considerations call for special imposition of liability upon





The plaintiff purchased electrical cable, manufactured by the defendant
foreign corporation, from a wholesale dealer. After eight months use the
cable was found to be defective and several power failures required its
removal. Suit was brought for a breach of implied warranty of fitness for
the purposes intended. Held, privity of contract between plaintiff and the
manufacturer was not a necessary prerequisite for recovery upon an implied
warranty. Continental Copper and Steel Indus., Inc. v. E. C. "Red" Cor-
nelius, Inc., 104 So.2d 40 (Fla. App. 1958).
20. "This implication [ that the rental owner is responsible 1 is underscored by the
nonexistence of any clause in the contract specifying that the motorcar should be
operated only by the renter." Fleming v. Alter, 69 So.2d 185, 186, 187 (Fla. 1953).
21. Leonard v. Susco Car Rental Sys., 103 So.2d 243, 247 (Fla. App. 1958).
22. Ibid.
23. Leonard v. Snsco Car Rental Sys., 103 So2d 243, 250 (Fla. App. 1958)
(dissenting opinion).
24. 69 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1953).
25. Leonard v. Susco Car Rental Sys., 103 So.2d 243, 250 (Fla. App. 1958)
(dissenting opinion).
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